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1 
Proportionality Review in Administrative Law 
Jud Mathews1 
(forthcoming in Comparative Administrative Law, second edition (Peter 
Lindseth, Susan Rose-Ackerman & Blake Emerson, eds.), 
Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2017.) 
1. Introduction 
At the most basic level, the principle of proportionality captures the 
common-sensical proposition that, when the government acts, the 
means it chooses should be well-adapted to achieve the ends it is 
pursuing. The proportionality principle is an admonition, as German 
administrative law scholar Fritz Fleiner famously wrote many decades 
ago, that “the police should not shoot at sparrows with cannons” 
(Fleiner 1928, 404). Courts instantiate the principle through a form of 
review that typically passes a challenged legal measure through a 
prescribed sequence of increasingly stringent legal tests, in order to 
determine whether the measure in fact impinges disproportionately on 
the rights or interests of a party. 
The global spread of proportionality is one of the worst-kept secrets in 
comparative law. As proportionality has become a fixture in numerous 
national and international legal regimes over the past few decades 
(Stone Sweet and Mathews 2008), it has also attracted a substantial 
amount of scholarly attention, and more than a little criticism.2 But the 
lion’s share of attention has focused on the use of proportionality in 
the realm of constitutional law, as a technique for adjudicating 
constitutional rights claims. Scholars have also given substantial 
consideration to the use of proportionality in regimes of public 
international law and and international investment law (Baade et al. 
2016; Bücheler 2015). Less has been said about proportionality’s role 
within administrative law. In fact, proportionality has also come to play 
a significant role in the administrative law of a large and diverse set of 
jurisdictions as a control on administrative discretion, even when 
constitutional rights are not in play.  
If the use of proportionality review in administrative law is widespread, 
it is also characterized by significant national differences. This chapter 
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aims to survey that diversity, and to help make sense of it, by 
organizing it and offering hypotheses about some of the sources of the 
variation that we observe. I draw on examples from several 
jurisdictions, but I do not claim that this account is remotely 
comprehensive or definitive.3 The use of proportionality review in 
administrative law is a topic that deserves more thorough and 
systematic study.4 Further empirical work would permit, among other 
things, testing of the hypotheses tentatively offered in this chapter.  
Proportionality in administrative law is something of a moving target, 
as changes are ongoing in many legal systems. Still, I suggest that we 
can understand the differences in how proportionality is used in the 
administrative law of different jurisdictions in terms of three principal 
axes of variation. With respect to any jurisdiction, we can ask: 
•   how extensive the use of proportionality is (for instance, is 
proportionality applied haphazardly, or only in a few settings, 
or is it a general head of review that applies in principle to all 
administrative actions?), 
•   how intensive the application of proportionality is (for instance, 
does proportionality entail serious judicial scrutiny, or 
substantial deference, or does it amount in practice to a low-
intensity reasonableness review?), and  
•   how discursive proportionality review is within the jurisdiction 
(for instance, do courts treat proportionality as a framework for 
reasoned justification, through which they explain their way to 
a conclusion in light of the relevant factors, or is the conclusion 
that a measure is proportional presented as an ipse dixit?) 
 Ultimately, I argue, we can resolve some of the cross-national 
variety that we see into intelligible patterns, at which point some 
underlying regularities in how proportionality is used begin to emerge. 
To be sure, the diversity is very real: not only in formal doctrinal 
structures, but even in what actors in different legal systems mean 
when they refer to “proportionality” or “balancing” (Bomhoff 2013, 
13-21). But it becomes possible to think of proportionality as a master 
concept of public law, and to see the differences in how it is 
instantiated—within different legal systems, in constitutional versus 
administrative law, and in different contexts within administrative 
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law—as adaptations to system- and context-specific differences.  
 The next section discusses the steps of proportionality review, 
and its historical origins. The section following describes the three 
major axes of variation. The last section assesses differences in how 
proportionality is applied, both across and within legal systems, and in 
conclusion considers proportionality’s place in public law. 
 
2. Proportionality Review: Elements and Origins 
2.1 The Elements of Proportionality Review 
What I will call the standard model of proportionality review consists 
of three or four steps, depending on who is doing the counting. Courts 
inquire successively into the (1) legitimacy, (2) suitability, (3) necessity, 
and (4) proportionality stricto sensu—in the strict sense—of a 
challenged measure. (In many jurisdictions, the first step is regarded as 
a threshold inquiry, rather than a part of the analysis proper).  
Suppose, for instance, that the Minister of Transportation issues 
regulations banning most heavy goods trucks from highways during 
daytime weekend hours. A full-dress review of the measure’s 
proportionality might look something like the following. First, as a 
preliminary matter, the court would ask whether the challenged 
measure serves a legitimate purpose: that is to say, a purpose it is 
permissible for the authority in question to pursue. This is a low bar to 
pass—it is a serious and rare infirmity for a government measure to 
have no legitimate purpose—and few measures are struck down at this 
stage. The Ministry should be able to justify the measure as a means to 
pursue ends for which it is responsible: reducing road congestion and 
improving public safety, for instance. 
Next, the court asks whether the challenged measure is a “suitable” 
means to the achievement of its purpose. This, too, is a fairly relaxed 
inquiry, similar in spirit to the rational basis review conducted by 
American courts. To qualify as suitable, a measure need not be the best 
possible or most appropriate; it need only make some contribution to 
the legitimate purpose already identified. If the Ministry can credibly 
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claim that the ban reduces congesting and improves safety, it will pass 
this test.  
From this point on, proportionality review becomes progressively more 
demanding—although in practice, just how demanding can vary quite 
a bit. The next question is whether the measure is necessary to achieve 
its stated goal. This necessity inquiry is often operationalized as a least-
restrictive means test: in other words, could the government’s purpose 
also be achieved by alternative measures that infringe less on the 
freedom or interests of others? If the answer is yes, the government’s 
action is a disproportionate measure, and hence impermissible.  
Whether our putative driving ban would survive this stage of review 
depends heavily on how the court conducts it. Least-restrictive means 
testing is, in principle, quite an intensive form of judicial scrutiny. But 
as discussed further below, courts in different jurisdictions have been 
known to modulate the stringency of the inquiry, for instance by 
adjusting how much deference they give to government judgments 
about the effects and availability of policy alternatives.  
If a measure survives the necessity test, it proceeds to the final phase 
of the inquiry, a balancing analysis, also known as “proportionality in 
the strict sense.” Now the court weighs the benefits of the challenged 
measure (which has already been found to be appropriately tailored to 
the end it serves) against its costs, in terms of infringements of protected 
rights or interests. Only if its benefits exceed the burden it imposes 
does the challenged measure survive. Obviously, in this final stage of 
the analysis, courts cannot avoid making policy assessments and value 
judgments.  
2.2 Origins of Proportionality Review 
The core idea of proportionality, of course, a very old one. In a 
concurrence, Israel’s Supreme Court President Aharon Barak found a 
version of the concept in twelfth-century philosopher Moses 
Maimonides’ instruction to use stronger medicines only if weaker 
medicines fail,5 and has identified still older antecedents in his 
scholarly work (Barak 2012). And courts have applied at least some 
version of a proportionality test for a long time as well. Paul Craig has 
recently unearthed a trove of sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
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English cases in which courts apply a “proportionability” standard in a 
number of contexts (Craig 2017).  
But the modern, multistep proportionality framework is an innovation 
of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, which has used it to 
adjudicate constitutional rights claims for more than half a century. 
And the Constitutional Court adapted the concept from German 
administrative law, where proportionality has played a role in judicial 
control of administrative action since the late nineteenth century. It is 
worth taking a very brief trip through proportionality’s origins in 
German legal thought and judicial practice, because the original 
justifications offered for proportionality as a fundamental legal 
principle still resonate today, or so I will suggest later. 
  The proportionality principle emerged when late-eighteenth 
century legal thinkers derived rules to govern the use of police power 
in light of first principles of political philosophy. By the late 1700s, 
cameralism—the German science of public administration—had 
largely accepted the social contractarian premise that state power rests 
on an implicit bargain between subjects and sovereign, whereby the 
former submit to the rule of the latter so that the sovereign can advance 
their common welfare. But if this bargain is the source of the state’s 
authority to act, it also sets the outer bounds of the state’s authority: 
the state is justified in acting only to the extent that its action promotes 
the public welfare. As applied to police law, in the words of jurist 
Günther Heinrich von Berg, “the police law may abridge the natural 
freedom of the subject, but only insofar as its lawful goal requires.”  
If the principle of proportionality was recognized by the end of the 
eighteenth century, proportionality review would not develop until 
nearly a century later, after administrative acts became subject to 
review by courts. The key development here was the establishment in 
Prussia of the Supreme Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht) 
in 1875. Within a few years, the court had fashioned the 
proportionality principle into a meaningful constraint over 
administrative discretion, both by circumscribing the legitimate ends 
of the police power, and also by scrutinizing the means chosen in 
pursuit of those ends.  
Two examples will suffice by way of illustrating the early 
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proportionality case law of the Supreme Administrative Court. In an 
1886 case, the court ruled that the police could not require, on public 
safety grounds, a landowner to remove a post erected at the edge of 
his property. Rather, all that was necessary to protect the public was 
requiring the landowner to light the post after dark. As the court 
explained, “[t]he protection from accidents . . . is indeed the task of 
the police; this task and the authority finds its limit, however, in that 
the chosen measures may not extends farther than they must to meet 
the goal of eliminating the danger.” That same year, the court ruled 
that it was disproportionate, and hence, impermissible for the police 
to close down a shop in response to the shopowner’s distribution of 
brandy without a license. The operation of the shop was itself not 
unlawful; only the distribution of brandy was. And so closing the shop 
was a more drastic step than the police needed to take to meet the 
legitimate goal of enforcing the license requirement.  
Other administrative courts within Germany soon began following 
Prussia’s lead, striking down police measures on proportionality 
grounds (Stern 1993, 168). Though the subjects of imperial Germany 
did not enjoy the protection of entrenched constitutional rights, 
proportionality did make a significant contribution to individual 
freedom and the rule of law, by regularizing the use of state power. 
 
3. Axes of Variation 
Today, a form of proportionality review plays at least some role in the 
administrative law of many legal systems, but the differences across 
jurisdictions are significant. I suggest that administrative law systems 
vary along three principal dimensions with respect to their use of 
proportionality review.   
3.1 Extensiveness of Use 
Administrative law systems differ in terms of how extensively they 
employ proportionality review. In some systems, proportionality is 
regarded as a constitutional or general principle of law that applies, in 
principle, to the whole corpus of law. In others, proportionality applies 
only to certain areas within administrative law, or crops up 
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unpredictably. And of course, some administrative law systems do not 
recognize proportionality as a governing legal standard at all.  
The European Union and Germany stand at one end of the spectrum, 
as jurisdictions in which the proportionality principle counts as 
fundamental law. In the European Union, proportionality numbers 
among the general principles of EU law, and applies to EU measures 
as well as to member state measures alleged to infringe freedoms 
guaranteed in EU Treaties (Tridimas 2006, 137-38). Similarly, in 
Germany, proportionality counts as a fundamental constitutional 
principle, derived from the rule of law, which applies to all acts of the 
state that implicate the subjective rights of individuals in any way 
(Jarass and Pieroth 2012, 529, 530).6 More recently, South Korea’s 
Constitutional Court has identified proportionality as a basic standard 
of review (Huang and Law 2014, 13).  
Significantly, even in jurisdictions where proportionality applies in 
principle to all acts of the state, it does not follow that proportionality 
dominates the decisional law of administrative tribunals, providing the 
rule of decision in most cases. The array of rules and requirements to 
which the administration must conform in a typical jurisdiction tends 
to generate a correspondingly wide set of grounds on which to 
challenge administrative actions. Moreover, proportionality generally 
only comes into play where the administration is authorized to 
exercise discretion, and legal systems may recognize grounds for the 
substantive review of administrative choices in addition to 
proportionality.  
Germany illustrates the point. Judicial review may be available of both 
regulations (Rechtsverordnungen) and concrete administrative acts 
(Verwaltungsakte — enforcement actions, for instance), but legal 
challenges to the latter predominate in German administrative law 
(Rose-Ackerman 1995, 60). German administrative law has well-
developed doctrines in place to govern the use of different forms of 
discretion by the administration (Marsch and Tünsmeyer 2016, 19-21). 
Some administrative choices that could be challenged as 
disproportionate grounds would also qualify as a misuse of discretion 
(Ermessensfehlgebrauch) and so could be invalidated on that ground 
(Maurer 2011, 149-50).7 There are different views among scholars as 
to how the proportionality principle relates conceptually to the 
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doctrines governing the use of discretion (Alexy 1986). But in 
administrative litigation, it seems that proportionality often ends up 
functioning as a last line of offense, to be litigated after other lines of 
attack against a measure fail, and when they are unavailable. 
In other jurisdictions, the use of proportionality has been formally 
confined to one or a few areas within administrative law. In England, 
for instance, the venerable and deferential Wednesbury standard 
continues to govern most administrative decisions. Proportionality, 
however, applies to matters decided under EU law or the Human 
Rights Act of 1998, which enacted as domestic law rights from the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Davies and Williams 2016, 
71). In Canada, proportionality informs the reasonableness review of 
administrative action insofar as it implicates rights guaranteed under 
Canada’s Charter of Rights and Values.8 And even though judicial 
review of administrative discretion is extremely limited in China, 
proportionality has made some scattered appearances there as well, 
including in a decision of the Supreme People’s Court,9 and 
significantly, in several lower court cases selected for publication in 
the anthology of Guiding Cases, which is edited by the Administrative 
Tribunal of Supreme People’s Court (Wang 2013, 14-17). In some 
jurisdictions, including Taiwan and South Korea, proportionality has 
been taken up unevenly by different high courts (Huang and Law 2014, 
13, 21).  
The adoption of proportionality in a jurisdiction, even to a limited 
extent, sometimes seems to trigger an expansion of proportionality’s 
use, or at least calls for such an expansion. Its adoption in the 
constitutional context may pave the way for its use in administrative 
law (or vice versa). In the years since the adoption of the Human Rights 
Act in the UK, a number of scholars there have called for the adoption 
of proportionality as a general head of review (Craig 2013, 88 n.24), 
and proportionality has in fact made some inroads in administrative 
caselaw (Davies and Williams 2016, 80).10 With respect to Canada, 
scholars have advanced different arguments to the effect that courts 
should more tightly integrate administrative law doctrines and 
constitutional law principles, including proportionality (Walters 2015; 
Carter 2004). In recent years, proportionality has experienced 
increased recognition in a number of Asian jurisdictions, including 
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Taiwan, Korea, and Japan as well as China, and may come to play a 
still more prominent role in those jurisdictions in years to come (Huang 
and Law 2014).  
France is a jurisdiction where proportionality has come to be widely 
used in a number of areas of administrative law over a period of years 
(Sanchez 2016, 43-44). Police measures that infringe on basic 
freedoms have long been subject to a form of proportionality review 
administered by France’s Conseil d’Etat, the highest administrative 
tribunal. For instance, in the celebrated Benjamin case from 1933, the 
Conseil d’Etat struck down a police measure banning a conference 
organized by a controversial political figure, on the grounds that less 
restrictive measures would have also preserved the peace.11  
Starting in the 1970s, the Conseil d’Etat began assessing urban 
planning decisions under the doctrine of le bilan (the balance sheet), 
which amounts to a proportionality balancing analysis: the court 
compares the advantages and disadvantages of a given plan to 
determine whether it is permissible (Brown and Bell 1998, 263). 
Proportionality also figures importantly in the review of administrative 
penalties in France.12 The Conseil d’Etat also appears to be becoming 
more self-conscious is its use of the proportionality concept in recent 
years: comparing the years 2001-2005 and 2010-2015, references to 
“proportionnalité” in the decisions of the Conseil d'Etat jumped 
roughly five-fold, while the volume of decisions overall declined by 
more than a third. And notably, France’s Constitutional Council began 
explicitly conducting proportionality review on legislation in 2008.13  
3.2 Intensity of Application 
Applied at full strength, proportionality review sets a very demanding 
standard. As mentioned above, its real teeth are to be found in the 
penultimate and final steps of the test’s canonical formulation, which 
subject the challenged measure to least restrictive means testing and a 
form of benefit-cost analysis, respectively. In practice though, there is 
substantial variation, across jurisdictions and across contexts, in how 
intensively proportionality is applied. 
Writing with reference to the Human Rights Act, Cora Chan has 
inventoried a number of techniques UK courts have employed to 
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soften the stringency of proportionality review. These include: skipping 
stages of the analysis or merging it into an omnibus “fair balance” or 
“reasonableness” review; granting some measure of deference to the 
primary decision maker’s judgment, either of the availability of less-
infringing alternatives or the proportionality of the measure more 
broadly; and limiting review to cases of “manifest disproportionality” 
(Chan 2013, 9). These techniques appear in other jurisdictions as well, 
alongside some others, such as shifting to a measure’s challenger the 
burden of demonstrating the availability of less onerous alternatives 
(De Búrca 1993, 111-12). 
In some jurisdictions, proportionality is rarely if ever applied in a very 
demanding form. In China, for example, Jing Wang reports that courts 
in China are reluctant to review discretionary decisions with 
substantial stringency, even in the rare instances where they are in a 
position to invoke proportionality at all (Wang 2013, 18-19). 
Elsewhere, courts appear to oscillate between more and less intensive 
versions of proportionality with little predictability. Describing the use 
of proportionality by Taiwan’s Constitutional Court, Cheng-yi Huang 
and David Law write that “the test remains underdeveloped and 
inconsistent in application” (Huang and Law 2014, 20). In systems 
where proportionality review is well-established, however, courts tend 
to vary the scrutiny of review with the context of the case in a more-
or-less predictable fashion. 
The EU offers a good example. The degree of scrutiny that the Court of 
First Instance and the European Court of Justice applies varies across 
the range of cases the courts hear, in light of the relative competences 
of courts and legislatures and the importance of the issues the courts 
are charged to protect (Craig 2006, 657). Judicial scrutiny is at a low 
ebb when the courts review discretionary choices that require political, 
social, and economic judgments and trade-offs.14 In such cases, the 
courts generally overturn only those directives or regulations found to 
be “manifestly disproportionate.” The courts tend to be less deferential, 
for instance, when reviewing burdens and penalties, which often pose 
substantial hardships for the individual challengers and do not usually 
implicate the design of broader regulatory programs (Craig 2006, 
681).15 A claim that a measure violates an EU right triggers high-
intensity review (Craig and De Búrca 2011, 546). Predicting the degree 
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of scrutiny may become more difficult to the extent that a case features 
factors that augur both for stepped-up and stepped-down scrutiny—
say, a broadly discretionary policy choice that allegedly violates a right 
(Craig and De Búrca 2011, 546). 
Varying the level of scrutiny with the case characteristics is a way the 
proportionality framework can be made to respect a number of values 
relevant to the administrative process or policy goals. For instance, in 
Japan, courts apply a notably deferential version of proportionality-
style review to administrative decisions not to act (Chikushi 2013). This 
directional deference—more pronounced towards agency inaction 
than action—reflects a sensitivity to the administration’s inherent 
advantage, relative to courts, in setting regulatory and enforcement 
priorities. EU courts make room for the precautionary principle in 
proportionality review insofar as it touches on the regulation of risk, by 
reviewing aggressive measures to reduce risks of serious harm with a 
fairly light touch (Craig 2006, 662).  
3.3 Discursiveness of Analysis 
Jurisdictions also differ in the extent to which courts use proportionality 
review to structure an in-depth discourse on the challenged measure. 
Proportionality offers a framework that courts can use to engage in 
detail and at length with the merits and faults of a measure, as put 
before the court by the contending parties. In working their way 
through the proportionality subtests, courts can build a reasoned 
justification for their rulings, acknowledging the competing interests 
on either side and explaining why, ultimately, one side prevails. (Stone 
Sweet and Mathews 2008, 89). But proportionality review is not 
always and everywhere employed so discursively. At the other 
extreme, courts can make bare assertions that measures are 
proportionate, or reward measures that survive some other kind of 
review with that label (Lin 2013, 14, 18-20). 
There may be a connection between the intensity and discursiveness 
of a court’s proportionality review. As described above, courts can 
moderate the intensity of review by shedding stages of the analysis or 
compressing them into a less invasive “reasonableness” review. But 
lowering the intensity of proportionality review does not necessarily 
entail sacrificing a deliberative, detailed evaluation of the competing 
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claims or a well-justified conclusion. As Paul Craig notes, even when 
they review measures under the fairly deferential “manifest 
disproportionality” approach, the Courts of the EU nonetheless engage 
in thorough, reasoned evaluation of the measures before them (Craig 
2006, 670). What would be surprising, on the other hand, would be 
for a court to reject a measure as disproportionate, without justifying 
that outcome by amply demonstrating the course of reasoning that led 
it to that conclusion—including, for instance, by pointing to less 
infringing alternatives the government could have chosen.  
Existing national norms of judicial practice will certainly shape how 
courts present their proportionality analysis, but proportionality itself 
may have some impact on judicial culture. France is an interesting case 
in point. Ruling from France’s high courts tend to be short and 
syllogistic, presenting their conclusions as the inevitable results of 
inexorable operations of deductive logic (Lasser 2005, 34). 
Structurally, the decisions consist of a series of “Whereas” clauses, 
terminating in an announcement of the court’s judgment. It is not that 
French courts do not engage in wide-ranging deliberations about the 
cases that they hear. They do, but these are typically conducted in 
ancillary documents that do not form a part of their published 
decisions (Lasser 2005, 47-60). The analysis in the decision itself may 
be skeletal in the extreme. France’s Constitutional Council, for 
instance, often concludes in a single sentence that a challenged 
measure is necessary, adequate, and proportionate (Sanchez 2016, 
44).16  
Still, the French administrative courts have shown that they can engage 
in a form of proportionality formula even within the confines of the 
syllogistic formula. They can do so by shoehorning the case-specific 
circumstances that guide their evaluation of a challenged measure’s fit 
into that formula. In an unpublished decision from early 2016, for 
instance, the Conseil d’Etat reviewed a challenge, on proportionality 
and other grounds, to a police order ordering the eviction of all those 
camped on public lands in a suburb of Paris within 48 hours.17 The 
Conseil disposed of the proportionality challenge in a long “Whereas” 
clause, the longest of the decision by far, that noted the dramatic recent 
increase in the encampments’ population, uncontroverted police 
reports noting unsafe and unsanitary conditions in the camps, and the 
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city’s provision of emergency housing for the camp’s residents before 
concluding that there was no “manifest breach of the conditions of 
necessity and proportionality.” 
Germany makes for an interesting comparison with France. German 
administrative court decisions can be exercises in sustained 
justification, with detailed consideration given to the relevant law and 
facts before the court. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find fairly in-
depth proportionality analyses in German administrative caselaw.18 
But notably, the courts do not engage in detailed analysis in all cases 
where the pass on the proportionality of a challenged measure. In 
circumstances where proportionality is not one of the major issues or 
the case, or the question is not a close one, German courts can also 
dispense with proportionality arguments quite briskly.19  
There may be some jurisdictions in which a conclusion that a measure 
is proportionate is sometimes little more than a naked assertion not 
fortified by further reasons. Writing about Taiwan, for instance, and 
specifically with reference to environmental litigation, Chun-Yuan Lin 
has characterized proportionality as a “meaninglessly mentioned 
principle” (2013, 13).  
Wherever courts conduct proportionality review, they of course do so 
against a backdrop of system-specific norms about the form of judicial 
decisions. But it is notable that, even given these differences, courts in 
different jurisdictions find the latitude to expand or contract the 
discursiveness of proportionality analysis, as they deem the 
circumstances of a case to demand. 
 
4. Assessment 
4.1 Patterns 
Broadly surveying the use of proportionality review in administrative 
law across jurisdictions, the first impression is one of a great diversity 
of approaches, across a number of dimensions: in terms of when, how, 
and how stringently the review is conducted. And to be sure, there are 
some pronounced national differences. And of course, there are many 
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systems that do not recognize proportionality as a head of review at all 
(even if, in some cases, they have doctrines that approximate 
proportionality review in some respects (Mathews 2016)).  
But a closer look reveals that there are substantial variations within 
legal systems as to how proportionality review is conducted in different 
circumstances. And at least some of the variation, within and across 
systems, begins to resolve itself into some broad patterns. In the space 
remaining, I will describe some of the patterns, and conclude with 
some comments about what this suggests about the role of 
proportionality in public law more generally.  
4.1.a Extensiveness 
Systems vary with respect to how extensively they employ 
proportionality review. In some jurisdictions, proportionality is 
wheeled out for use in a discrete set of contexts only, whereas in 
others, proportionality is recognized as a constitutional principle or 
general principle of law. But even in systems where proportionality in 
principle applies across the board, in practice it does not dominate 
administrative litigation, since other normative controls over 
administrative power are also in place. Regardless of the formal status 
of proportionality principle, there are some “usual suspects”: legal 
contexts in which proportionality frequently turns up, wherever else it 
might appear. These include the review of administrative penalties, 
and administrative actions that implicate rights or other sensitive 
individual interests.  
It makes sense that these would be areas of law where the use of 
proportionality is prominent. These are areas in which the stakes of 
government overreaching are especially palpable, because individuals 
are directly and adversely affected in salient ways. Under these 
circumstances, the appeal of a formula for review that blocks 
inappropriately far-reaching measures is intuitive and powerful.  
The use of proportionality has expanded outward over time, both 
across legal systems, and within legal systems. There are reasons that 
favor proportionality’s spread, but also factors that may check the 
breadth of its adoption to a greater or lesser degree in different legal 
systems. There are both strategic and normative logics to 
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proportionality’s spread (Stone Sweet and Mathews 2008). For judges, 
proportionality review offers a useful and flexible set of tools for 
managing difficult dispute-resolution environments. The 
proportionality framework offers a court an opportunity to 
acknowledge the validity of the competing interests on either side of a 
dispute and to justify its own decision with reference to the particular 
circumstances of the case.  
What is more, proportionality is subject to a kind of hydraulic 
normative logic. Once courts declare that some administrative uses of 
discretion should be reviewed from proportionality, declining to 
extend proportionality review to other discretionary choices is 
tantamount to conceding that disproportionate actions are permissible 
some of the time. Courts may find it difficult to justify that result 
(although the task may be easier to the extent courts can rely on well-
established doctrines curtailing the scope of review).  
At the same time, national differences of several kinds stand in the way 
of anything like a convergence with respect to the scope of 
proportionality’s application. Administrative law doctrines that are 
already in place will shape how proportionality is received in a legal 
system. More broadly still, structural features in administrative law 
systems determine what kinds of administrative decisions are in 
principle subject to judicial review, and may exclude important classes 
of decisions.20  
Moreover, both formal and functional differences in the scope of 
judicial review and the role of courts vis-à-vis the administration can 
condition how extensively proportionality is used. Systems with strong 
norms against substituting judgment may be especially resistant to the 
use of anything like proportionality to review policy-sensitive 
judgments thought to lie within the administration’s expertise. And 
courts that lack meaningful independence may be in a poor position 
to review the proportionality of high-stakes, politically salient choices. 
It would be surprising, for instance, to find courts in China exerting 
meaningful proportionality review over eminent domain decisions, as 
we see in France, given the limited independence that Chinese courts 
enjoy as a practical matter.21  
4.1.b Intensity 
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Some patterns also emerge with respect to the intensity of 
proportionality review. To be sure, there is a considerable amount of 
residual variability as well, with the stringency of review varying for 
idiosyncratic reasons in some contexts. But in systems where 
proportionality is well-established, we see courts calibrating the 
intensity of review to the circumstances of the litigation, according to 
more-or-less explicit and intelligible formulas. Courts tend to be more 
deferential to the decision maker’s choice of measure to the extent that 
those choices implicate policy judgments, or administrative expertise, 
or the management of risk. Courts are more likely to apply 
proportionality full strength to the extent that the measures under 
review threaten harm to individual rights or other favored interests.  
In fact, it may that having some rubric for varying the intensity of 
review is necessary if proportionality is to become a prominent feature 
in a jurisdiction’s administrative law. Applied most strictly, 
proportionality review leaves no room for deference to the judgments 
of primary decision makers. But this most demanding form of review 
will be a non-starter in contexts in which those judgments are deemed 
to deserve at least some weight. On the other hand, varying the 
intensity of review on a purely ad hoc basis opens courts to charges of 
unpredictability and arbitrariness.  
Accordingly, it makes sense that systems in which proportionality is 
prominent typically devise some framework to regularize how the 
intensity of review varies. The amount of attention given to the 
problem of controlling the variable intensity of review within a legal 
system may be one indicator that the system is reaching the saturation 
point with respect to proportionality. 
4.1.c Discursiveness 
  There also appear some underlying regularities to variations in 
the discursiveness of proportionality review. Proportionality can 
function as a justification structure courts can use to justify their rulings 
through systematic, reasoned appraisal of the challenged measures. 
The norms of judicial decision-writing may be more or less congenial 
to this use of proportionality in different systems, and the importance 
of reason-giving may vary as well.  
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The extent to which courts use proportionality review as an 
opportunity to ventilate, in their written decisions, the appropriateness 
of a challenged measure will obviously differ depending on these 
system-specific features. But two further points are worth noting. First, 
even in systems where stripped-down, syllogistic decisions are the 
norm, courts can still find room for a proportionality analysis that 
shows off how the court carefully tested the challenged measure’s fit. 
And second, courts across systems can expand and contract 
proportionality review like an accordion, depending on how much 
justification the court deems its conclusion to require.  
4.2 Proportionality’s Place in Public Law 
If the brief survey above demonstrates anything, it is that 
proportionality review is readily adaptable to a host of different 
circumstances. Courts can dispense with elements of the standard 
model and conduct review more or less stringently, while still retaining 
the core idea of an appropriate relationship between means and ends. 
 But if proportionality’s protean character is one of the secrets of its 
success, it is not the only one. The widespread adoption of 
proportionality review within administrative law systems also reflects 
the normative attractiveness of the proportionality ideal as a 
benchmark for judging state behavior. As described above,  Prussian 
police law scholars articulated a legitimating logic for proportionality 
that reduces to two key propositions: first, that what legitimates the use 
of public power is the pursuit of public purposes, and second, its 
corollary, that exercises of public power should extend no further than 
those purposes require. These propositions continue to resonate, 
including in modern liberal democracies, and can justify the use of 
proportionality to test government measures that constrain private 
liberties. 
While the adjudication of constitutional rights claims and the review 
of administrative discretion typically occur within separate doctrinal 
boxes, this rationale for proportionality applies in principle to both. 
And in systems where the use of proportionality is well-developed, the 
distinction between proportionality as a principle of constitutional law 
and as a principle of administrative law can erode. The paradigmatic 
example is Germany, where the constitutional proportionality 
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principle has essentially absorbed the proportionality principle 
anchored in police law.  
When proportionality makes frequent appearances in both 
constitutional and administrative contexts, it begins to look more like 
a general organizing framework for the review of government 
measures. On this view, constitutional rights claims are distinctive in 
that they are the basis for challenge to a wider range of government 
actions (for instance, to legislative as well as administrative action) and 
because they trigger particularly searching review. But, from this 
perspective, they can be regarded essentially as special manifestations 
of a more general government obligation to act proportionately. 
Courts and other institutions face decisions that will determine whether 
and to what extent their legal systems embrace proportionality as a sort 
of master concept of public law. These questions are already coming 
up. For instance, in Canada, the issue of proportionality’s scope and 
how it bears on the relation between constitutional law and 
administrative law has arisen in a number of cases in recent years, 
which have divided its Supreme Court (Walters 2015).22 Rejecting 
some calls for a broader rapprochement between constitutional law 
and administrative law, the Court has most recently adopted the 
position that proportionality does not apply as such to reviews of 
administrative discretion, but does inform the administrative law 
reasonableness analysis, insofar as administrative measures implicate 
the values of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.23  
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions serve as a reminder that the 
place of proportionality in public law remains contested in many 
systems. While some functional and normative logics augur in favor of 
generalizing proportionality into a kind of all-purpose criterion of legal 
legitimacy, a broad set of countervailing factors generate significant 
and enduring cross-national variations in when and how 
proportionality review is actually conducted.  
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